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FUNERAL PROTESTS, PRIVACY, AND THE
CONSTITUTION: WHAT IS NEXT AFTER
PHELPS?
MARK STRASSER
In Snyder v. Phelps, the United States Supreme Court struck down a damages
award against Reverend Fred Phelps Sr. and the Westboro Baptist Church for
picketing a military funeral. Although the Court asserted that its holding was narrow
and the legal issues involved were straightforward, this Article argues that Phelps
ultimately raises more questions than it answers and almost guarantees increased
confusion in First Amendment jurisprudence. The Court in Phelps explained that
the First Amendment prohibits tort damages when the comments at issue involve
matters of public concern, yet failed to explain whether private speech that was
juxtaposed with public, political speech also warranted the protection of the First
Amendment. The Court also neglected to provide guidance on how its holding fits
into the current defamation and privacy jurisprudence; in addition, it left
unanswered pertinent questions about the constitutionality of a growing number of
funeral protest statutes. Lower courts are likely to feel frustrated by this decision and,
consequently, a relatively clear area of the law is likely to become muddled.
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INTRODUCTION
1

In Snyder v. Phelps, the United States Supreme Court issued a
much-anticipated decision, striking down a damages award against
Reverend Fred Phelps, Sr. and the Westboro Baptist Church for
picketing the funeral of a Marine killed in Iraq. In a relatively short
opinion, the Court suggested that the legal issues were
straightforward—the First Amendment precludes the imposition of
tort damages when the comments at issue involve matters of public
2
concern. Yet, the Court failed to explain whether comments that
were not of public concern were somehow immunized by those that
were. The Court also failed to explain how the holding fits into
current defamation and privacy jurisprudence. The opinion raises
more questions than it answers, and is sufficiently opaque that one
cannot tell whether it marks a sea-change in the jurisprudence or,
instead, is a straightforward application of it.
Part I of this Article offers a brief discussion of the background
behind Phelps and of the torts asserted by the father of Lance
Corporal Matthew Snyder against Phelps and the Westboro Baptist
Church. Part II discusses the constitutional limitations imposed on
torts involving defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional
1. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
2. Id. at 1215 (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 758–59 (1985)).
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infliction of emotional distress that were recognized prior to Phelps.
Part II also explains why these limitations might have cast light upon,
but could not determine, the correct resolution of a case involving
the imposition of damages for funeral picketing. The Article
concludes by explaining that although Phelps resolved very little, it
nonetheless almost guarantees increased confusion in First
Amendment jurisprudence.
I.

THE FUNERAL AND THE POSSIBLE TORTS IMPLICATED

Matthew Snyder’s funeral was picketed by a group protesting,
among other things, Catholicism and equality policies across the
3
country. That same group posted various hurtful comments about
Snyder on their website; as a result, Albert Snyder—the father of the
4
deceased Marine—sued the group, asserting various claims in tort.
While some of these claims were found to be without merit as a
matter of law, others were left to the jury to decide, resulting in a
5
substantial verdict. This section includes a brief discussion of the
background of the case and the various tort theories asserted.
A. Background
On March 3, 2006, Matthew Snyder died fighting for his country in
6
Iraq. A notice regarding the time and place of the funeral was
7
placed in local papers in Westminster, Maryland. Five days later,
Phelps, the pastor of the Westboro Baptist Church, became aware of
the funeral and issued a news release announcing that he and his
8
family would picket the funeral.
The plaintiff and the defendants differed on why the funeral was
being picketed. The defendants said that they “traveled to Matthew
Snyder’s funeral to publicize their message of God’s hatred of

3. See id. at 1226 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that the Phelps family had
discussed, among other issues, “homosexuality, the Catholic Church, and the United
States military”).
4. See Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (D. Md. 2008) (noting that the
case proceeded to trial on the issues of intrusion upon seclusion, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy), rev’d, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir.
2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
5. See Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1214 (“A jury found for Snyder on the intentional
infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy claims,
and held Westboro liable for $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million
in punitive damages.”). The district court reduced the punitive damages award to
$2.1 million. Id.
6. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 571.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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9

The defendants
America for its tolerance of homosexuality.”
admitted that “their picketing efforts gained increased attention
when they began to picket funerals of soldiers killed in recent
10
years.” Albert Snyder argued that the defendants transformed the
11
“funeral for his son into a ‘media circus for their benefit.’”
The defendants picketed the funeral at a location that was in
12
accord with local law and police instructions. Phelps and his family
held up several signs, some of which expressed general points of view,
such as “God Hates the USA,” “America is doomed,” “Pope in hell,”
13
and “Fag troops.” However, some of the other signs could have
been construed as having been directed at Matthew Snyder and his
14
15
16
parents, such as “You are going to hell” and “God hates you.” By
the same token, while some of the comments on the Westboro Baptist
Church website might have been characterized as generalized
17
opinions about the United States, others might have been perceived
18
as being directed at the family in particular, for example that
“Matthew Snyder was raised for the devil and was taught to defy
19
God.”
Albert Snyder only became aware of the signs that had been near
20
his son’s funeral after the funeral had taken place. Later still, he
became aware of the comments that the Westboro Church published
21
on their website in an “epic” about his son.
Snyder testified that he suffered great harm as a result of the
22
picketing and posting of the epic on the Church’s website. Expert
testimony corroborated the long-lasting and detrimental effects

9. Id. at 571–72.
10. Id. at 571.
11. Id. at 572.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 578.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. For example, a later posting on their site makes the more general claim that
God is killing our soldiers out of wrath. See News Release, Westboro Baptist Church,
God Hates America & is Killing Our Troops in His Wrath (May 12, 2011),
http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/20110512_Dead-Soldiers-MI-Friese-OR-Lara.pdf
(“GOD HATES AMERICA & IS KILLING OUR TROOPS IN HIS WRATH.”).
18. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 578.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 572 (explaining that Snyder was unaware of the content of the
signage used by the Church “until he saw a television program later that day with
footage of the Phelps family at his son’s funeral”).
21. Id.
22. See id. (describing Snyder’s reaction to the epic, which included vomiting and
weeping).
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23

The issue at hand was
caused by the church members’ actions.
whether the Phelps family could be held liable in tort for the injury
that their speech had caused.
B. Tort Law
The comments on the protesters’ signs and the church’s website
potentially implicated a number of tort-related issues, including
whether Matthew Snyder and his parents had been defamed. Yet,
there are a number of reasons why a defamation action under these
circumstances was unlikely to succeed. First, in many states, a
defamation action cannot be brought on behalf of an individual who
24
is deceased, so such an action could not be maintained on behalf of
Matthew Snyder by his father. If the claim was that the parents had
been defamed, it would then be necessary to determine the content
of the allegedly defamatory statements. Suppose, for example, that
the defendants’ comments were construed as merely suggesting, in
an admittedly offensive way, that the Snyders had raised their son as a
25
26
Catholic. In that event, the comments would not be defamatory.
Another tort claim asserted unsuccessfully by Albert Snyder was
27
that Phelps wrongfully made private facts public. The district court
rejected this claim, at least in part, because the information revealed
28
was already a matter of public record.
While the trial court granted the defendants’ motions for summary
judgment with respect to defamation and publication of private facts,
the court permitted the jury to decide Snyder’s claims of intrusion
23. Id.
24. See Johnson v. KTBS, Inc., 889 So. 2d 329, 332 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (“Once a
person is dead, there is no extant reputation to injure or for the law to protect.”);
Channel 4, KGBT v. Briggs, 759 S.W.2d 939, 940 n.1 (Tex. 1988) (noting that a cause
of action cannot be brought “for the defamation of a person already dead”); see also
Gruschus v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 342 F.2d 775, 776 (10th Cir. 1965) (explaining that
the common law did not permit the reflection “in the reputation of another[,]” and
thus “the action did not survive the death of the defamed party”); Fitch v. Voit, No.
CV 92-063, 1993 WL 141588, at *5 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 1993) (observing that Alabama’s
“survival statute” made no allowance for a libel action brought by the surviving
relative of the defamed dead), aff’d, 624 So. 2d 542 (Ala. 1993).
25. The signs included “Pope in Hell,” “You’re Going to Hell,” and “God Hates
You.” Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 223–24 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207
(2011). The “epic” included the comment, “[The Snyders] also, in supporting
satanic Catholicism, taught Matthew to be an idolater.” Id. at 225. These all might
be understood to be condemning the Snyders for having raised Matthew as a
Catholic.
26. Cf. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 572–73 (observing that there was no defamatory
communication because the posted “epic” was “Phelps-Roper’s religious opinion”).
27. See id. at 572 ( (noting that this was one of Snyder’s claims).
28. Id. at 573 (noting that the allegedly private facts were already a matter of
public record).
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upon seclusion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil
29
conspiracy. The jury found for the plaintiff on all three, although it
was unclear whether Snyder met his burden of proof on any of these
30
claims under existing state law.
Consider the damages awarded for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. To successfully bring an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
‘defendant[s], intentionally or recklessly, engaged in extreme and
outrageous conduct that caused the plaintiff to suffer severe
31
emotional distress.’”
Extreme and outrageous conduct involves a standard that is by no
32
means easy to meet. There are numerous cases in which individuals
have engaged in objectionable conduct that nonetheless did not
33
meet the relevant standard. That said, however, there are a number
of cases recognizing that individuals are particularly vulnerable when
34
there has been a death in the family, and may be even more
35
vulnerable when attending a funeral, so behavior that is typically not
29. See id. (determining that these three claims raised genuine issues of material
fact).
30. See Phelps, 580 F.3d at 227 (Shedd, J., concurring) (positing that Snyder failed
to provide “sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict on any of his tort claims”).
31. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 580 (citing Miller v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 121 F.
Supp. 2d 831, 839 (D. Md. 2000)).
32. But see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress Tort, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 300, 300-01 (2010) (explaining
that outrageousness is a subjective standard that can be perceived differently by
“some judge, jury, university administrator, or other government actor”).
33. See Crockett v. Essex, 19 S.W.3d 585, 590 (Ark. 2000) (admonishing a funeral
home and its director for conduct that was “rude and illustrative of a lack of
professionalism,” but declining to hold that such conduct was “so extreme and
outrageous as to be beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be utterly
intolerable in a civilized society”); Stahl v. Health Alliance Plan, No. 179879, 1996
WL 33323984, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Tope v. Howe, 445 N.W.2d 452
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989)) (dismissing a “crass and insensitive” claim for failing to “rise
to the level of extreme and outrageous” because “mere insults, indignities . . . and
other trivialities” could not warrant liability); see also Phelps, 580 F.3d at 232 (Shedd,
J., concurring) (contending that, whatever the propriety of the Phelps’ protest, “this
conduct simply does not satisfy the heavy burden required for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress under Maryland law”).
34. See, e.g., Thomas v. Hosp. Bd. of Dirs. of Lee Cnty., 41 So. 3d 246, 256 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (declaring that “the action of providing false information
concerning the loved one’s cause of death meets the standard for a claim of outrage
(intentional infliction of emotional distress)” because of the heightened sensitivity of
the survivor to emotional distress).
35. See, e.g., Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 372 (6th Cir. 2008)
(discussing the Funeral Protest Provision, which had the purpose of protecting
funeral attendees from “the harmful psychological effects of unwanted
communication when they are most captive and vulnerable”); Thomas, 41 So. 3d at
256 (explaining that “the appellees’ conduct in making false statements—which led
to the interruption of Mildred Thomas’s funeral and the return of her body for a
second, more thorough autopsy—rises to the level of atrocious and utterly
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thought of as extreme and outrageous might be found to be so in the
36
special circumstances surrounding the death of a loved one.
Even in instances in which the behavior at issue is beyond all
possible bounds of decency, a separate question is whether the injury
37
itself is sufficiently severe to meet the requirements of the tort.
Even if the degree of severity can be established, the plaintiff must
show that it was the defendant’s action, rather than something else,
that caused the harm. For example, it might be argued that Snyder’s
harm was more aptly attributed to the loss of his son than to the
38
actions of the Phelps family.
In this case, however, testimony
39
established that the defendants’ actions “had a significant impact,”
40
causing the plaintiff to suffer “‘severe and specific’ injuries.”
The Fourth Circuit did not address whether Snyder met his burden
under state law because the defendants had not addressed that issue
41
on appeal and were held to have waived that basis for challenging
42
the award. The appellate court instead examined whether the First
Amendment precluded the imposition of liability under any of the
43
tort theories asserted, ultimately concluding that the imposition of
tort damages in this case was precluded by constitutional
44
guarantees. Snyder petitioned for certiorari, and the United States
intolerable behavior which cannot be condoned in a civilized community”); see also
Alan Brownstein & Vikram David Amar, Death, Grief, and Freedom of Speech: Does the
First Amendment Permit Protection Against the Harassment and Commandeering of Funeral
Mourners?, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 368, 370 (2010) (discussing “the unique
vulnerability of audience members in special locations and times such as funerals,
and the uniquely demeaning way in which these funeral hecklers were trying to use
the mourners as stage props rather than an audience”).
36. Cf. Brownstein & Amar, supra note 35, at 377–78 (arguing that courts
frequently recognize recovery under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress for deliberate interference with funerals).
37. See, e.g., Dale v. Thomas Funeral Home, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 805, 808 (Neb.
1991) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
because even though the plaintiff was “perturbed, worried, and upset,” she failed to
demonstrate that her emotional distress was so severe that no reasonable person
could endure it).
38. See Volokh, supra note 32, at 309 (“It seems unlikely that [the speech at issue]
would much exacerbate the father’s grief—a grief that stems from his son’s death,
not from the speech of a small minority of hateful, anti-American kooks and publicity
hounds.”).
39. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d. 567, 580 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 580 F.3d 206
(4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
40. Id. at 580–81.
41. See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 216 (4th Cir. 2009) (observing that “the
Defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence”), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207
(2011).
42. Id.
43. See id. at 218 (declaring that the First Amendment could be invoked as a
defense against a plaintiff seeking “damages for reputational, mental, or emotional
injury allegedly resulting from the defendant’s speech”).
44. Id. at 226.
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Supreme Court took up the case to address whether, under the First
Amendment, “Westboro must be shielded from tort liability for its
45
picketing in this case.”
II. TORT DAMAGES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Cases like Phelps, where tort claims and the First Amendment
intersect, raise two important inquiries. One issue involves whether a
particular plaintiff has met his burden with respect to establishing all
the elements of the tort claims asserted. Even if a plaintiff meets
those state tort law requirements, a separate issue is whether the
United States Constitution will allow the plaintiff to recover damages.
As this portion of the Article will demonstrate, the constitutional
jurisprudence in this area is far from clear, which is one reason the
46
Phelps decision was greatly anticipated.
A. The Developing Defamation Jurisprudence
When attempting to determine whether the speech at issue in
Phelps is constitutionally protected, one should consider the
jurisprudence in several related areas. The inquiry should begin by
examining defamation jurisprudence. While defamation cases do not
address all the issues raised in Phelps, this jurisprudence might
nonetheless cast light on how this case should be decided because
the defamation case law is more developed and has been used to
47
inform constitutional limitations imposed on other related torts.
1.

Public officials, public figures, and defamation
48
The Court established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan that a
public official cannot recover “damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement
was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was
49
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” An
important purpose of the opinion was to preclude “the possibility

45. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1212 (2011).
46. See generally Sean Gregory, Inside the Supreme Court’s Free Speech Showdown, TIME
(Oct. 6, 2010) http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2024062,00.html
(suggesting that Snyder v. Phelps had received more public attention than any other
Supreme Court case that term).
47. See Howard C. Nielson, Jr., Comment, Recklessly False Statements in the PublicEmployment Context, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1277, 1297 (1996) (discussing “the Supreme
Court’s well developed body of defamation jurisprudence”).
48. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
49. Id. at 279–80.
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that a good-faith critic of government will be penalized for his
50
criticism.”
51
In Garrison v. Louisiana, the Court explained why the actual
malice standard should be employed in cases involving an alleged
defamation of a public official. Where the “criticism is of public
officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private
reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the
52
Constitution, in the dissemination of truth.”
Even where false
claims had indeed been made, the Constitution prohibits “attaching
adverse consequences to any [such claims] except [those made with]
53
knowing or reckless falsehood.” Were a different standard used,
such as common law actual malice, then a speaker who honestly
believed that a public official engaged in wrongdoing might be
deterred from speaking out, because she might fear that her dislike
of the official might be established in court and somehow used to
impose liability for the expression of sincerely held (but possibly
mistaken) beliefs. Use of the common law malice standard might
thus undermine the free exchange of ideas and the discovery of
54
truth.
An individual who asserts her sincerely held but mistaken belief
about a public official might spur an investigation, which might lead
to the discovery of the truth about the official or, perhaps, about the
wrongdoing incorrectly attributed to the official. Yet, the same point
might be made about an individual who makes statements that she
knows to be false—these statements might also spur an investigation
and discovery of the truth. Nonetheless, the Court rejected that the
twin rationales of promoting the free exchange of ideas and the
discovery of truth should also justify immunizing assertions of known
55
falsehoods. The Court’s rejection reflected its belief that that the
knowing falsehood was of such little value that it did not enjoy
56
constitutional protection.
50. Id. at 292.
51. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
52. Id. at 72–73.
53. Id. at 73.
54. See id. (“Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must
run the risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred; even if he did
speak out of hatred, utterances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange
of ideas and the ascertainment of truth.”).
55. See id. at 75 (noting that an “honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further
the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech,” but that “it does not follow that the
lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like
immunity”).
56. See id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))
(categorizing calculated falsehoods as “fall[ing] into that class of utterances which
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The Court later expanded the scope of the protections discussed in
New York Times beyond public officials to include public figures,
explaining that public figures command “sufficient continuing public
interest and ha[ve] sufficient access to the means of
counterargument to be able ‘to expose through discussion the
57
falsehood and fallacies’ of the defamatory statements.”
Public
figures, like public officials, have access to the media and will be
afforded the opportunity to rebut false statements made about them.
Because public figures are afforded a forum where they can deny
false accusations and attempt to undo the damage resulting from
false assertions, there is less of a need to afford them the opportunity
to receive tort damages to compensate them for the wrong associated
with false accusations that damage reputation. Because that is so, tort
damages can be reserved for the most egregious kinds of defamatory
statements, e.g., those that are asserted notwithstanding the speaker’s
knowledge or strong suspicion that the statements are false.
a.

Demonstrating actual malice

The actual malice standard is a daunting one. To show that the
defendant published false statements with actual malice, there “must
be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in
58
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.”
59
In St. Amant v. Thompson, the Court offered some examples in which
a jury might reasonably conclude that the defendant had not believed
60
the truth of his allegation. The Court explained that “[p]rofessions
of good faith will be unlikely to prove persuasive, for example, where
a story is fabricated by the defendant [and] is the product of his
61
imagination.” Of course, even in the extreme case of a fabricated
story, matters may not be so clear-cut. For example, notwithstanding
an inability to uncover the relevant evidence, an individual might still
be certain that a public official has committed wrongdoing. That
individual might express her sincere suspicions, both because she
believes them and because she hopes that others will step forward to
‘are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality’”).
57. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (citing Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
58. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
59. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
60. Id. at 732.
61. See id. at 732 (adding that an assertion of good faith is also inadequate when a
story is based entirely on an unverified, anonymous telephone call, or when the
allegations made are so improbable as to be reckless).
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help substantiate the accusations.
Suppose that an individual publicly expresses her suspicions about
an official’s wrongdoing, undeterred by the lack of hard evidence to
substantiate those allegations. Suppose further that the official has in
fact been falsely accused and has thereby suffered harm. One might
say that anyone who publishes an accusation without substantiation
should be potentially liable for any harm that might be caused.
While that would be a possible position, it does not reflect the
current system in the United States, because such a system would
62
likely have the undesirable effect of greatly chilling speech. This
reflects the Court’s fear that a rule that “compels a publisher or
broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual assertions may
63
lead to intolerable self-censorship.”
Use of the actual malice standard is intended to limit the degree to
which publishers or broadcasters engage in voluntary self-censorship.
As long as the publisher neither knows that the statement at issue is
false nor has a reckless disregard for its truth, the publisher will not
be held liable for false and possibly defamatory statements about a
64
public figure.
b.

Proving recklessness as actual malice

The recklessness prong requires further explication. The St. Amant
Court explained that “recklessness may be found where there are
obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the
65
accuracy of his reports.” However, the Court was not suggesting that
recklessness will be established whenever there is good reason to
believe that the official has been wrongly accused. To the contrary,
“reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent
man would have published, or would have investigated before
66
publishing.” Instead, there must be “sufficient evidence to permit
the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts
67
as to the truth of his publication.” Thus, the recklessness prong of
the actual malice standard will not be met merely by showing that a
reasonable person would not have been confident that the claims at
62. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (explaining that
punishing an erroneous statement would “run[]the risk of inducing a cautious and
restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and
press”).
63. Id.
64. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1969) (stating that
the Constitution requires an actual malice standard).
65. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732.
66. Id. at 731.
67. Id.
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68

Even the recklessness prong of the actual
issue were accurate.
malice standard is quite difficult to meet.
Private actors and defamation: The Rosenbloom standard
69
70
In both New York Times and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the
Court emphasized that the actual malice standard should be used
when allegedly defamatory comments have been made about a public
71
figure. However, the actual malice standard was also used in a case
in which a private figure was allegedly defamed while matters of
public concern were being addressed. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
72
Inc., the Court considered “whether the New York Times’ knowing-orreckless-falsity standard applie[d] in a state civil libel action brought
not by a ‘public official’ or a ‘public figure’ but by a private individual
for a defamatory falsehood uttered in a news broadcast by a radio
station about the individual’s involvement in an event of public or
73
general interest.”
George Rosenbloom argued that a broadcast
claiming that he was arrested for selling obscene materials was false
74
and defamatory, as established by his subsequent acquittal.
While “the police campaign to enforce the obscenity laws was an
75
issue of public interest,” an important issue was whether
Rosenbloom’s status as a private citizen would lower the requisite
threshold to impose damages for the broadcast of libelous comments.
The Rosenbloom plurality responded in the negative, reasoning that “if
a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly
become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or
because in some sense the individual did not ‘voluntarily’ choose to
76
become involved.”
Because that is so, the plaintiff’s “prior
77
anonymity or notoriety” is of secondary importance.
Yet, the justifications for applying the actual malice standard in
cases involving public figures do not seem as applicable in cases
involving private figures. A private figure might not have the same
kind of access to the media as would a public figure, which would
2.

68. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279 (declining to adopt a rule requiring a
critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of his assertions).
69. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
70. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
71. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279–
80.
72. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion), abrogated by Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
73. Id. at 31–32.
74. Id. at 36.
75. Id. at 40.
76. Id. at 43.
77. Id.

STRASSER.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

WHAT IS NEXT AFTER PHELPS?

3/26/2012 8:08 PM

291

make it harder for the plaintiff to counter the allegedly false and
78
defamatory claims. A private individual also does not assume the
risk public figures take that others might publish negative and
79
possibly defamatory statements.
The Rosenbloom plurality offered a somewhat surprising response to
the claim that public and private figures were distinguishable. The
plurality essentially pointed out that some public figures also do not
have access to the media because such access might depend upon the
80
“media’s continuing interest in the story.” The Court further noted
that even in those instances in which public figures were accorded
81
access to the media, they may be unable to undo the damage.
Rather than permitting tort damages to be awarded when defamatory
statements are negligently made about a private figure, the plurality
suggested that states instead should simply assure that such
individuals would have access to the media to correct the inaccurate
82
assertions, notwithstanding the plurality’s own point that such access
might well prove unavailing.
The argument that private figures should also be afforded access to
the media does not address the rationale that public figures
voluntarily enter into the limelight and thus should have less access
83
to tort damages for defamatory statements made about them. The
plurality offered two observations about such a claim. First, it
characterized the “idea that certain ‘public’ figures have voluntarily
exposed their entire lives to public inspection, while private
individuals have kept theirs carefully shrouded from public view” as a
84
legal fiction.
The plurality also feared that emphasizing the
distinction between public figures and private individuals might have
the “paradoxical result of dampening discussion of issues of public or
general concern because they happen to involve private citizens while
extending constitutional encouragement to discussion of aspects of

78. Id. at 45–46 (reasoning that even some lesser-known public figures do not
command the same media attention as public figures that are very prominent).
79. Id. at 45 (noting that the petitioner, in seeking a lower threshold to impose
damages, argued that the private individual “has not assumed the risk of defamation
by thrusting himself into the public arena”).
80. Id. at 46.
81. See id. (explaining that “[d]enials, retractions, and corrections are not ‘hot’
news” as they “rarely receive the prominence of the original story”).
82. Id. at 47 (“If the States fear that private citizens will not be able to respond
adequately to publicity involving them, the solution lies in the direction of ensuring
their ability to respond, rather than in stifling public discussion of matters of public
concern.”).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 48.
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the lives of ‘public figures’ that are not in the area of public or
85
general concern.”
One difficulty with the Rosenbloom rationale is that the plurality
seemed to undercut the justification for using the actual malice
standard even in cases involving public figures. Suppose the
Rosenbloom plurality is correct that public figures are not accurately
thought to have assumed the risk that they would be publicly
86
subjected to possibly false and unfair criticism. Suppose further that
the plurality is correct to doubt that public figures have enhanced
access to the media and that they will be able to repair reputational
87
damage even when they are accorded that access. In that event, it
would seem inaccurate to claim that public figures generally can
adequately defend themselves and thus do not need the tort system
for compensation for injury to their reputations.
Rejecting Rosenbloom: easing defamation requirements for private
individuals
88
In any event, as the Court subsequently made clear, the Rosenbloom
89
plurality position was rejected in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. At issue in
Gertz was a published article that contained serious and defamatory
90
inaccuracies about the plaintiff, Elmer Gertz. The magazine editor
denied any knowledge that the allegations in the article were false
and, further, claimed to have relied on the author’s reputation and
3.

85. Id.
86. Id. at 47–48.
87. Id. at 46–47.
88. This clarification was best expressed in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S.
448 (1976), where the Court observed that:
Were we to accept [that mere interest to the public qualifies an issue as a
public controversy], we would reinstate the doctrine advanced in the
plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), which
concluded that the New York Times privilege should be extended to
falsehoods defamatory of private persons whenever the statements concern
matters of general or public interest. In Gertz, however, the Court repudiated
this position, stating that “extension of the New York Times test proposed by
the Rosenbloom plurality would abridge [a] legitimate state interest to a
degree that we find unacceptable.”
Id. at 454 (citing Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974)); see also W. Wat
Hopkins, Snyder v. Phelps, Private Persons and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress:
A Chance for the Supreme Court to Set Things Right, 9 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 149,
162 (2010) (explaining that the theory that the First Amendment “requires a
heightened burden of proof in tort actions related to matters of public concern[,]”
notwithstanding “the public private or status of a plaintiff[,] is contrary to the
holdings of the Supreme Court”).
89. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
90. See id. at 326 (describing the false claims about Gertz, including that he was a
criminal, a Communist, and involved in the attack on the Chicago police that
occurred during the 1968 Democratic Convention).
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on the author’s history of submitting accurate articles. Reliance on
reputation was part of the justification for refusing to hold the
92
publisher liable in New York Times, and one of the issues that arose in
Gertz was whether the New York Times standard was applicable in a
93
defamation suit brought by a plaintiff who was a private individual.
While a libel award to a private individual was struck down in
94
Rosenbloom, no controlling rationale existed in that opinion.
The Gertz Court found the Rosenbloom plurality’s rationale
unpersuasive and refused to extend the New York Times First
Amendment protections to cases involving private individuals. The
Court then analyzed how defamation involving a private individual
should be approached.
The Gertz Court explained that under the First Amendment “there
95
is no such thing as a false idea,” and that no matter how “pernicious
an opinion may seem, its correction should be founded upon “the
competition of other ideas,” not the “conscience of judges and
96
juries.”
However, the Court reasoned that “there is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact[,]” as “[n]either the
intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s
interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on public
97
issues.” Not only are such statements viewed as lacking in value, but
they are not even viewed as instrumentally likely to lead to the
98
discovery or reinforcement of truth.
The Court classified such
statements as “belong[ing] to that category of utterances which ‘are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
99
morality.’”
91. Id. at 328.
92. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287 (1964).
93. Id. at 332 (“The principal issue in this case is whether a newspaper or
broadcaster that publishes defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither
a public official nor a public figure may claim a constitutional privilege against
liability for the injury inflicted by those statements.”).
94. Id. at 333; see also Leslie C. Griffin, Snyder v. Phelps: Searching for a Legal
Standard, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 353, 357 (2010) (arguing that the Court
“never adopted the Rosenbloom plurality’s standard” and that instead, “defamation law
became linked to some mixture of public and private figures with public and private
concerns”).
95. See Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 339 (detailing the different opinions
contained in Rosenbloom and their inability to be reconciled with one another).
96. Id. at 339–40.
97. Id. at 340 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
98. Id. at 340.
99. Id. at 339–40 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942)).
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Rejecting the Rosenbloom emphasis on whether the issue at hand
was a matter of public concern, the Gertz Court instead reaffirmed the
importance of considering the type of individual who had allegedly
100
The Court believed that upholding a heightened
been defamed.
standard for public figures “administers an extremely powerful
101
antidote to the inducement to media self-censorship.”
However,
affording robust protections of free expression concerning public
figures has a downside; namely, “it exacts a correspondingly high
102
price from the victims of defamatory falsehood,” because “many
deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally subjected to injury,
103
will be unable to surmount the barrier of the New York Times test.”
The Court viewed the constitutional guarantees of free expression as
involving a balancing on the one hand of the “interest of the press
104
and broadcast media in immunity from liability” and on the other
of the “limited state interest present in the context of libel actions
105
The Court then suggested that “the
brought by public persons.”
state interest in compensating injury to the reputation of private
individuals requires that a different rule should obtain with respect to
106
them.”
It might seem surprising that the state’s interest would differ
107
depending on the nature of the individual allegedly defamed.
However, to justify this dichotomy, the Court reaffirmed the preRosenbloom rationale that “public figures usually enjoy significantly
greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence
have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements
108
[than] private individuals normally enjoy.” Precisely because public
figures and private individuals are dissimilar with respect to their
ability to engage in self-help, private individuals are “more vulnerable
100. See id. at 342 (“Those who, by reason of the notoriety of their achievements or
the vigor and success with which they seek the public’s attention, are properly classed
as public figures and those who hold governmental office may recover for injury to
reputation only on clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was
made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.”).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 343.
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. Id.
107. See generally Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966) (recognizing a
“pervasive and strong [state] interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon
reputation”); id. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The right of a man to the
protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects
no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human
being—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”).
108. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
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to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly
109
greater.”
The Court offered another reason to distinguish between these two
types of plaintiffs besides their differing abilities to access the media
to counter defamatory claims, namely, that public scrutiny naturally
110
follows deliberate exposure to the public limelight. In contrast, the
private individual “has relinquished no part of his interest in the
protection of his own good name, and consequently, he has a more
compelling call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by
111
defamatory falsehood.”
The Court concluded its discussion by
noting that “private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury
than public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving
112
of recovery.”
Because the Court concluded that public and private plaintiffs
occupied different legal positions, it rejected the Rosenbloom analysis,
concluding that “the States should retain substantial latitude in their
efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious
113
to the reputation of a private individual.” Had the Court held that
any defamatory assertions involving a matter of public interest were
subject to the actual malice standard, then “a private individual whose
reputation [was] injured by defamatory falsehood that [did] concern
an issue of public or general interest [would have] no recourse unless
114
he [could] meet the rigorous requirements of New York Times.” But
this would not permit the state to offer adequate protection for the
reputations of private individuals. To accomplish that particular
objective, the Gertz Court held that “so long as they do not impose
liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of
115
defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.”
At least with respect to defamation, the current jurisprudence does
not solely focus on whether the matter at issue is of public or private
concern. Instead, other factors are also considered, including the
type of individual who was allegedly victimized. It was thus surprising
that the Phelps Court concluded that the question of whether the

109. Id.
110. Id. (observing that an individual seeking governmental office “must accept
certain necessary consequences of that involvement in public affairs” and “runs the
risk of closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case”).
111. Id. at 345.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 345–46.
114. Id. at 346.
115. Id. at 347–48.
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“First Amendment prohibits holding Westboro liable for its
speech . . . turn[ed] largely on whether that speech is of public or
116
private concern” and that liability could not be imposed because, as
a nation, we have chosen to “protect even hurtful speech on public
117
issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.”
Such an
oversimplified view neither reflects the current state of defamation
jurisprudence nor First Amendment jurisprudence more generally.
B. Constitutional Limitations on Other Torts
One reason that Phelps is somewhat difficult to analyze is that there
is no case on point. While there is a developing defamation
jurisprudence, the damage award in Phelps was not based on injury to
reputation, but instead on injury resulting from the intentional
118
There have been a number of
infliction of emotional distress.
other cases in which the Court has attempted to establish the
constitutional limits imposed on recovery for related kinds of torts,
although the core issues in those cases are distinguishable in
important ways from the issues implicated in Phelps. This portion of
the Article discusses those cases and their potential applicability to
Phelps.
1.

The actual malice standard and the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress
Consider one of the Court’s classic cases involving intentional
119
infliction of emotional distress, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, which
involved a suit by the fundamentalist preacher Jerry Falwell against
Larry Flynt’s Hustler Magazine. At issue was a parody of a Campari
advertisement in which Falwell was depicted as describing his “first
120
time” with his mother in an outhouse.
The magazine labeled the
121
advertisement as a parody, and it was not thought to be making any
122
factual claims.
Nonetheless, Falwell found the parody offensive,
and Hustler’s satire was perceived as “doubtless[ly] gross and
123
repugnant in the eyes of most.”
The Falwell Court noted that “the law does not regard the intent to
116. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011).
117. Id. at 1220.
118. See id. at 1214 (noting that the trial court held that there was no defamation
as a matter of law).
119. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
120. Id. at 48.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 50 (noting that the “speech could not reasonably have been interpreted
as stating actual facts about the public figure involved”).
123. Id.
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inflict emotional distress as one which should receive much
solicitude, and it is quite understandable that most if not all
jurisdictions have chosen to make it civilly culpable where the
124
Nonetheless, the
conduct in question is sufficiently ‘outrageous.’”
Court also cautioned that “in the world of debate about public affairs,
many things done with motives that are less than admirable are
125
protected by the First Amendment.”
As a result, some
commentators have suggested that Falwell should be understood to
immunize discussions about public affairs from tort liability even if
such discussions are about a private individual, as long as actual
126
malice cannot be established.
However, when the Court’s
comments are considered in context, a less robust interpretation
127
seems more plausible.
One of the concerns that militated in favor of striking down the
intentional infliction of emotional distress award against Hustler
128
Magazine was the malleability of the outrageousness standard.
As
the Falwell Court explained, “‘Outrageousness’ in the area of political
and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which
would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes
or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular
129
expression.”
Because of this malleability, the Court imposed the
actual malice requirement for claims made by “public figures and
public officials [such as Falwell] . . . for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications [such as
130
Hustler Magazine’s satirical advertisement].”
It is simply unclear
whether, as a constitutional matter, the Court’s refusal to uphold an
award on the basis of outrageous political or social discourse should
be understood to be limited to contexts involving public figures or
whether, instead, that concern has a much broader reach.
131
132
Like Phelps, Falwell was argued in the Fourth Circuit. When the
124. Id. at 53.
125. Id.
126. See Volokh, supra note 32, at 304–05 (explaining that defamatory statements
are often equally as offensive to private figures as public ones, although only
negligently made).
127. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Snyder v. Phelps, Outrageousness, and the Open
Texture of Tort Law, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 473, 491 (2011) (criticizing the “Falwell-based
defense of the Phelpses’ position” because it was not a “tenable reading” of the
Court’s decision in that case).
128. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988).
129. Id.
130. See id. at 56 (describing actual malice as having “knowledge that the
statement was false” or making a statement with “reckless disregard as to whether or
not it was true”).
131. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
132. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986), rev’d sub nom. Hustler
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Fourth Circuit analyzed whether the award against Hustler Magazine
should be upheld, the court recognized that Falwell was a public
133
figure and that the New York Times standard would play some role.
Indeed, the Fourth Circuit attempted to apply the actual malice
standard in the context of intentional infliction of emotional
134
distress. However, the court rejected “the literal application of the
135
actual malice standard” as inappropriate; under such a literal
application, liability could only attach if the parody was published
notwithstanding the publisher’s knowledge that the parody was false
136
or made with reckless disregard for its truth.
Were that the
standard, Hustler Magazine certainly would have not been liable
because it made no assertions of fact, much less assertions of fact that
137
were tortious in light of the actual malice standard.
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that requiring a plaintiff to “prove
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth in an action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress would add a new element
138
to this particular tort, and alter its nature.”
The court instead
incorporated actual malice into the intentional infliction context by
requiring that the defendant’s misconduct be intentional or
139
reckless.
In such instances, the court reasoned, the “first
amendment will not shield intentional or reckless misconduct
resulting in damage to reputation, and neither will it shield such
140
misconduct which results in severe emotional distress.”
Because
Larry Flynt had intentionally published the parody and testified that
141
he intended to cause Falwell emotional distress, the Fourth Circuit
suggested that the jury might have found that the first element of the
142
tort had been satisfied.
The Supreme Court, in deciding Falwell, rejected the Fourth
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
133. Id. at 1274.
134. Id. (“The defendants are, therefore, entitled to the same level of first
amendment protection in the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
that they received in Falwell’s claim for libel.”).
135. Id.
136. See id. (examining Hustler’s contention that Falwell had to “prove that the
parody was published with knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth”).
137. See id. at 1273–74 (noting Hustler’s contention that, as “the jury found that
the parody was not reasonably believable,” the statements contained within the
parody could not be statements of fact “but must be opinion and are, therefore,
completely shielded by the first amendment”).
138. Id. at 1275.
139. See id. (observing that Virginia law on intentional infliction of emotional
distress first “require[d] that the defendant’s misconduct be intentional or
reckless”).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1276.
142. Id.
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Circuit’s method of incorporating the actual malice standard into the
143
intentional infliction of emotional distress context.
The Court
explained that it was insufficient for a state to assert that it was
“protecting public figures from emotional distress” in denying “First
Amendment protection to speech that is patently offensive and is
intended to inflict emotional injury, even when that speech could not
reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the
144
public figure involved.” In effect, the Court was preventing public
figures from doing an end run around First Amendment
145
protections.
There are several ways to read Falwell and apply it to Phelps. If the
Falwell decision emphasizes the limitations on when public figures can
recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
case would seem to have little import for whether Albert Snyder
146
could collect such damages, since he does not qualify as a public
147
figure. If, however, the crux of Falwell is the Court’s focus on and
distrust of the outrageousness standard and its suggestion that the
First Amendment provides robust protection for discussions of public
affairs, then Falwell might support protection of at least some of the
148
statements of the Phelps family.
2.

The privacy interest and tortious injury
Because Falwell is distinguishable from Phelps in that the former
149
involved a public figure, it does not provide clear guidance with
respect to the proper resolution of Phelps. Several other cases may be
143. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).
144. Id.
145. See Arlen W. Langvardt, Stopping the End-Run by Public Plaintiffs: Falwell and
the Refortification of Defamation Law’s Constitutional Aspects, 26 AM. BUS. L.J. 665,
668 (1989) (asserting that the Court virtually eradicated public figures’ opportunity
to receive tort damages for defamatory statements through an emotional distress
claim).
146. But see Volokh, supra note 32, at 304–05 (“[T]he underlying rationale of
Hustler . . . applies to all speech on matters of public concern—whether the plaintiff
is a public figure or a private figure, and whether the speech is about a public figure,
a private figure, or no particular person at all.”).
147. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1222 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“Petitioner Albert Snyder is not a public figure.”); see also Richard Weisberg, Two
Wrongs Almost Make a “Right”: The 4th Circuit’s Bizarre Use of the Already Bizarre
“Milkovich” Case in Snyder v. Phelps, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 345, 347 (2010)
(asserting that the Snyders were private figures).
148. But see infra notes 208–211 and accompanying text (suggesting that the
Court’s comment about public affairs was intended to refer to contexts involving
public figures).
149. Compare Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (“Here it is clear
that respondent Falwell is a ‘public figure’ for purposes of First Amendment law”),
with Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1222 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Petitioner
Albert Snyder is not a public figure.”).
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helpful to consider, including some involving the publication of
private information.
150
Consider Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, which involved the
publication of the name of a seventeen-year-old victim who was raped
151
and murdered. Georgia law made it a misdemeanor to publish the
152
name or identity of a rape victim.
A reporter, Thomas Wassell,
learned the name of the victim from an indictment that was available
153
for inspection.
That night, he included the victim’s name in a
television news report about the proceedings, which was aired again
154
the following day. The victim’s father sued the station for invasion
155
of privacy.
The tort of public disclosure, recognized in Georgia,
protected the plaintiff’s “right to be free from unwanted publicity
about his private affairs, which, although wholly true, would be
156
offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities.”
The Cohn Court recognized that “powerful arguments can and have
been made that ‘there is a zone of privacy surrounding every
individual, a zone within which the State may protect him from
157
intrusion by the press, with all its attendant publicity.’”
However,
the Court also recognized that important interests were served by
protecting the press in their accurate reporting about matters of
158
public concern.
Because there were important and competing
159
interests at stake, the Court framed the issue narrowly—”whether
the State may impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the
name of a rape victim obtained from public records—more
specifically, from judicial records which are maintained in
connection with a public prosecution and which themselves are open
160
to public inspection.”
The Court answered that question in the
161
negative.
Several other cases established that the state must satisfy a very high
burden before it can prevent the publication of truthful

150. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
151. Id. at 471.
152. Id. at 471–72.
153. Id. at 472–73.
154. Id. at 473–74.
155. Id. at 474.
156. Id. at 489.
157. Id. at 487.
158. Id. at 490–91.
159. See id. at 491 (recognizing a “sphere of collision between claims of privacy
and those of the free press,” as both interests were “plainly rooted in the traditions
and significant concerns of our society”).
160. Id.
161. Id.

STRASSER.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

WHAT IS NEXT AFTER PHELPS?

3/26/2012 8:08 PM

301

162

information. One case in particular bears examination here, if only
because the publication of the information at issue both foreseeably
and actually caused great harm.
163
In The Florida Star v. B.J.F., the Court addressed a Florida statute
prohibiting the publication of the name of a victim of a sexual
164
offense. The Florida Star published a rape victim’s name obtained
165
The victim testified that she had suffered
from a police report.
greatly from the publication of her name—she was forced to “change
her phone number and residence, to seek police protection, and to
166
obtain mental health counseling.” Presumably, one reason Florida
statutorily prohibited divulging the name of a sexual assault victim
was to prevent certain foreseeable harms.
For example, the
individual who committed the assault might be induced to threaten
the victim further or, perhaps, others reading about the assault might
make such threats, either as a prank or with the intent of
167
perpetrating additional harm.
The B.J.F. Court explained that “the sensitivity and significance of
the interests presented in clashes between First Amendment and
privacy rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no
168
more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case.” In
this case, the Court held that the First Amendment precluded the
169
In doing so, the Court reasoned that in
imposition of liability.
instances “where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it
has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all,
only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order,
and that no such interest is satisfactorily served by imposing
170
liability . . . under the facts of this case.”
162. See, e.g., Okla. Publ’g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 310 (1977) (per
curiam) (holding that “the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not permit a state
court to prohibit the publication of widely disseminated information [the name and
photo of a minor charged in a shooting] obtained at court proceedings which were
in fact open to the public”); see also Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105–
06 (1979) (“At issue is simply the power of a state to punish the truthful publication
of an alleged juvenile delinquent’s name lawfully obtained by a newspaper. The
asserted state interest cannot justify the statute’s imposition of criminal sanctions on
this type of publication.”).
163. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
164. See id. at 526.
165. Id. at 527.
166. Id. at 528.
167. E.g., id. at 542–43 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that, in the aftermath of the
publication of her identity, “B.J.F. received harassing phone calls, required mental
health counseling, was forced to move from her home, and was even threatened with
being raped again”).
168. Id. at 533.
169. Id. at 541.
170. Id.; see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517–18 (2001) (holding that the
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The cases above are open to numerous interpretations. For
example, it might be thought that the First Amendment offers special
171
protection to publishing and broadcast media. The Court has often
discussed the importance of preventing voluntary self-censorship by
172
the press and has further suggested that the press sometimes
173
functions as the public’s “eyes and ears.” Were this the correct
reading of the cases protecting the right to publish accurate
information, it would not seem to help the Phelps family very much,
both because the Phelps family was not acting as the press reporting
on events and because what they said, while perhaps not false, is
better construed as not asserting facts about the Snyders at all rather
174
than as making accurate assertions about them.
Even if the First Amendment were thought to give the press and
media special protection, it would be inaccurate to believe that the
175
First Amendment gives the news media a carte blanche.
A few
important cases involving protection of the media are relevant for
purposes of the discussion here.
a.

Zacchini, the right of publicity, and funeral protests
176

At first blush, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. would
seem unhelpful in determining the constitutional limitations on tort
liability for funeral protests, as Zacchini involved a broadcast of an
177
individual’s entire circus act during a news program.
The
First Amendment protected the disclosure of an illegally intercepted cell phone
conversation where those disclosing the information played no role in illegally
intercepting it).
171. But cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684–85 (1972) (denying newsmen a
“constitutional right of access to the scenes of crimes or disaster when the general
public is excluded”); id. at 685 (affirming the ability of states to prohibit the news
media from “attending or publishing information about trials if such restrictions are
necessary to assure a defendant a fair trial before an impartial tribunal”).
172. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“Our decisions
recognize that a rule of strict liability that compels a publisher or broadcaster to
guarantee the accuracy of his factual assertions may lead to intolerable selfcensorship.”).
173. E.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978).
174. The Fourth Circuit, for example, construed the statements as simply not
making factual assertions about the Snyders at all. See Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206,
223 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that “no reasonable reader” would interpret the signs
held by the Phelpses “as asserting actual and objectively verifiable facts about Snyder
or his son”), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
175. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669–72 (1991) (rejecting
an argument that the First Amendment precluded the imposition of damages against
the defendant newspapers for publishing the identity of a confidential source);
Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 693 (1989) (affirming a
libel verdict against the defendant newspaper under the New York Times standard).
176. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
177. Id. at 563–64.
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accompanying commentary about the circus act was favorable, so it
would have been unreasonable for the individual to assert that he or
179
his act were unfairly maligned.
However, Ohio law specified that
“one may not use for his own benefit the name or likeness of another,
180
whether or not the use or benefit is a commercial one.” As a result,
the broadcaster “would be liable for the appropriation over [the
performer’s] objection and in the absence of license or privilege, of
181
[the performer’s] right to the publicity value of his performance.”
The issue before the Court was whether “the First and Fourteenth
Amendments immunized [the broadcaster] from damages for its
alleged infringement of [the performer’s] state-law ‘right of
182
publicity.’”
The case would have been very different if the television station
“had merely reported that petitioner was performing at the fair and
described or commented on his act, with or without showing his
183
picture on television.”
But by televising the entire act, the station
184
had done much more.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that the station was
“constitutionally privileged to include in its newscasts matters of
public interest that would otherwise be protected by the right of
publicity, absent an intent to injure or to appropriate for some
185
nonprivileged purpose.” The Ohio court wrongly assumed that the
Constitution required use of the actual malice standard in any case
186
involving publication on a matter of public interest.
But, as Gertz
makes clear, the United States Supreme Court had never envisioned
that the actual malice standard would be used in all tort actions in
which compensation was sought for harms allegedly resulting from a
187
wrongful publication concerning the plaintiff.
When deciding Zacchini, the Ohio Supreme Court had been misled
188
by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Time, Inc. v. Hill,
which established that in false light cases involving matters of public
178. Id. at 564 n.1.
179. See id. at 572–73 (citing William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389,
400 (1960)) (describing how the law of privacy is divided into four types of intrusions
of four different interests, only some of which require injury to reputation).
180. Id. at 565.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 569.
184. See id. at 576 (describing the effect of broadcasting the whole performance as
“similar to preventing petitioner from charging an admission fee”).
185. Id. at 569.
186. See id. at 571–72.
187. For a discussion of Gertz, see supra notes 88–115 and accompanying text.
188. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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189

interest, the actual malice standard should be employed even if the
190
plaintiff is a private individual.
But false light cases implicate a
191
reputational interest, whereas the interest at issue in a right of
publicity case involves “the right of the individual to reap the reward
192
of his endeavors.”
Because the interests implicated are different,
there is no constitutional requirement that the actual malice standard
be used in these distinct kinds of torts.
The Zacchini Court noted that in “‘false light’ cases the only way to
protect the interests involved is to attempt to minimize publication of
the damaging matter, while in ‘right of publicity’ cases the only
193
question is who gets to do the publishing.”
Basically, the Court
implied that awarding damages in false light cases serves the function
of chilling reputation-harming speech, whereas awarding damages in
right of publicity cases serves the function of redistributing monies
194
from the undeserving defendant to the deserving plaintiff.
In the
right of publicity cases, the communication of ideas is not chilled,
although the misappropriation of others’ work is disincentivized.
Cases centered around false light or the right of publicity are not
directly on point in a funeral-picketing case. Reputational interests
were not at issue in Phelps, and the whole point in the funeral protest
case is not to minimize publication per se but, instead, to limit where
the protest occurs so that the funeral is not disrupted and so that
participants in the funeral are not subjected to an attack at a time
195
and in a place where the individuals are most vulnerable.
189. False light cases involve “publicity that places the plaintiff in a ‘false light’ in
the public eye.” Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562 at n.7 (citing William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48
CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960)).
190. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 570–71 (noting that the Ohio court “relied heavily”
on Hill and that the Hill Court held “the opening of a new play linked to an actual
incident was a matter of public interest and that Hill could not recover without
showing that the Life report was knowingly false or was published with reckless
disregard for the truth”); see also Hill, 385 U.S. at 387–88 (explaining that First
Amendment protections prohibited application of a state statute allowing for
“redress [of] false reports of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that
the defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless
disregard of the truth”).
191. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573 (quoting William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L.
REV. 383, 400 (1960)) (“‘The interest protected’ in permitting recovery for placing
the plaintiff in a false light ‘is clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of
mental distress as in defamation.’”). Even if one limits the focus to cases involving a
reputational interest, Gertz makes clear that it is inaccurate to believe that the actual
malice standard must be met whenever matters of public concern are at issue.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. But cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213, 1218 (2011) (noting that the
church told authorities of its intent to picket, remained on public land, and did not
yell or use violence).
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Arguably, Zacchini and funeral protest cases are both about control
of the conditions under which certain contents are communicated;
however, there are important aspects in which the analogy between
the two cases breaks down. For example, the Zacchini Court
suggested that an “entertainer . . . usually has no objection to the
widespread publication of his act as long as he gets the commercial
196
benefit of such publication.” However, Snyder was not seeking the
commercial rewards of the funeral protest. Instead, he would have
preferred that the funeral protest had never taken place.
The Zacchini Court’s analysis of the harm to the plaintiff is
interesting to note. The Court reasoned that the “effect of a public
broadcast of the performance is similar to preventing petitioner from
197
charging an admission fee,” positing that “if the public can see the
act free on television, it will be less willing to pay to see it at the
198
fair.”
Of course, seeing such an act on television might not be as
enjoyable as seeing it in person, and the favorable publicity from the
news broadcast might have increased circus attendance. Be that as it
may, the Zacchini Court accepted the legitimacy of the goal of
199
“preventing unjust enrichment,” and the Court implied that the
television station was unjustly enriched by broadcasting the entire
200
act.
Arguably, individuals who protest at funerals to get free
201
publicity might be viewed as being unjustly enriched, and Zacchini
provides not only a possible rationale for imposing liability under
such circumstances but also a method of computing damages—one
might have experts testify in light of industry standards about how
202
much the free publicity would have cost had it been purchased.
Indeed, Justice Alito noted that on other occasions the Phelps family
203
had agreed not to protest in exchange for free air time, which
196. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573.
197. Id. at 576.
198. Id. at 575.
199. See id. at 576 (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law: Were Warren and
Brandeis Wrong? 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 326, 331 (1966)) (“No social purpose is
served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have
market value and for which he would normally pay.”)).
200. See id. at 575–76.
201. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217 (2011) (stating that there was
“no doubt that Westboro chose to stage its picketing at . . . Matthew Snyder’s funeral
to increase publicity for its views”).
202. Cf. Lisa Greene, Helmets of sand still grind on skeptics, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES 1,
Mar. 27, 2001, at 4B (discussing how much certain free publicity would have cost if
purchased).
203. See Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1224 (Alito, J., dissenting) (explaining that the church
agreed not to picket the funeral of a young girl killed in a Tucson shooting in
exchange for “free air time on the radio”); id. at 1225 (observing that in 2006, “the
church got air time on a talk radio show in exchange for canceling its threatened
protest at the funeral of five Amish girls killed by a crazed gunman”).
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suggests that the Church is gaining a benefit (exposure that would
presumably be very costly to purchase) at the expense of others when
they are most vulnerable.
States differ about what must be shown in order for an unjust
enrichment claim to be brought successfully. For example, suppose
that under state law a plaintiff cannot prevail on an unjust
enrichment claim unless she can show that the defendant received a
benefit for which the plaintiff expected to receive compensation or
would have expected to receive compensation had the plaintiff
204
known the facts.
In such a state, an unjust enrichment action
brought by a funeral protest victim would likely be unsuccessful
because the plaintiff would not have expected to be paid for the free
publicity accorded to the funeral protesters.
Yet some state courts have described the elements of unjust
enrichment rather broadly. The Iowa Supreme Court offered the
basic elements of an unjust enrichment case as requiring that: “(1)
[the] defendant was enriched by the receipt of a benefit; (2) the
enrichment was at the expense of the plaintiff; and (3) it is unjust to
205
allow the defendant to retain the benefit under the circumstances.”
The Colorado Supreme Court similarly described unjust enrichment
as requiring a showing that “(1) at plaintiff’s expense (2) defendant
received a benefit (3) under circumstances that would make it unjust
206
for defendant to retain the benefit without paying.”
A family
victimized by a funeral protest could perhaps successfully bring an
unjust enrichment claim in light of these elements, but only if the
enrichment enjoyed by the defendant (free publicity) was
understood to be at the family’s “expense” in the relevant legal
207
sense.
In his own Supreme Court case, Jerry Falwell argued that Zacchini
supported his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
because “the State [sought] to prevent not reputational damage, but
the severe emotional distress suffered by the person who is the
208
subject of an offensive publication.” The Court rejected Falwell’s
204. See, e.g., Fasching v. Kallinger, 510 A.2d 694, 699–700 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1986) (holding that survivors of a murder victim were precluded from
recovering damages from murderer’s biographer because survivors conferred no
benefit on murderer and expected no remuneration).
205. Dep’t of Human Servs. ex rel. Palmer v. Unisys Corp., 637 N.W.2d 142, 154–
55 (Iowa 2001).
206. Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998, 1007 (Colo. 2008) (en
banc) (citing DCB Constr. Co., Inc. v. Cent. City Dev. Co., 965 P.2d 115, 119–20
(Colo. 1998).
207. See id. (requiring that the unjust enrichment be at the plaintiff’s expense).
208. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (citing Zacchini v.

STRASSER.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

WHAT IS NEXT AFTER PHELPS?

3/26/2012 8:08 PM

307

argument primarily because “in the world of debate about public
affairs, many things done with motives that are less than admirable
209
are protected by the First Amendment.”
However, in discussing
debates about public affairs, the Falwell Court made clear that it
specifically had discussions about public officials in mind, citing
210
Garrison in support.
This explains the Falwell Court’s conclusion
that “while such a bad motive may be deemed controlling for
purposes of tort liability in other areas of the law, . . . the First
Amendment prohibits such a result in the area of public debate about
211
public figures.”
Basically, Falwell was not helped by the Zacchini rejection of the
actual malice standard in a non-defamation tort context, because
Falwell was a public figure. But Zacchini’s categorization and
distinguishing of torts might be very important in an intentional
infliction of emotional distress action involving a private individual,
especially given Gertz’s recognition that the state has different
interests implicated when protecting private individuals rather than
212
public figures.
b.

Pacifica Foundation, offensive speech, and the duty to avert one’s
attention

A much different case involving the media that would seem to have
213
relevance here is FCC v. Pacifica Foundation. That case involved a
complaint about the broadcast of George Carlin’s “Filthy Words”
214
monologue on the radio during the middle of the afternoon. The
215
Court held that the “indecent” speech at issue, although afforded
216
constitutional protection, nonetheless could be restricted so that it
would only be broadcast at a time when children would be less likely

Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)).
209. Id. at 53.
210. See id. (discussing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964)). For a
discussion of Garrison, see supra notes 51–56 and accompanying text.
211. Falwell, 458 U.S. at 53 (emphasis added).
212. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341–45 (differentiating the
state’s interests in protecting the reputations of private and public individuals by the
latter group’s voluntary exposure and greater opportunity for rebuttal, and by the
need to balance the interest in protecting public figures against the interest in an
“vital and uninhibited” press).
213. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
214. Id. at 729.
215. See id. at 741 (noting that there was “no basis for disagreeing with the . . .
conclusion that indecent language was used in this broadcast”).
216. Id. at 744 (declaring that Carlin’s monologue was “unquestionably ‘speech’
within the meaning of the First Amendment”).
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to listen. The Court employed a “nuisance rationale,” explaining
that “[w]ords that are commonplace in one setting are shocking in
219
another . . . one occasion’s lyric is another’s vulgarity.”
The Pacifica Foundation Court understood that its holding might
220
221
seem to contradict its decision in Cohen v. California.
At issue in
Cohen was the conviction of an individual who had been in a
courthouse wearing a jacket with the words “Fuck the Draft” written
222
on it.
The Cohen Court suggested that those objecting to the
223
Analogously, a parent who
message could simply avert their eyes.
did not want her child to hear Carlin’s monologue might either
224
change the station or turn off the radio.
The Pacifica Foundation
Court rejected the proposition that the ease with which one might
turn off the radio either negated the harm or provided an adequate
225
remedy.
Pacifica Foundation suggests that some kinds of expression, while
protected, may nonetheless be channeled in a manner where the
communication can still take place at certain times and in certain
places but will not have the undesirable effects that might occur
226
absent the channeling.
Thus, for example, the Court upheld in
217. See id. at 750 (observing the Commission’s placement of emphasis on the
time of day); id. at 749 (concluding that “Pacifica’s broadcast could have enlarged a
child’s vocabulary in an instant”); see also id. at 757 (Powell, J., concurring) (“The
Commission’s primary concern was to prevent the broadcast from reaching the ears of
unsupervised children who were likely to be in the audience at that hour.”)
(emphasis added).
218. Id. at 750.
219. Id. at 747.
220. See id. at 747 n.25 (describing contextual factors supporting the Court’s
holding that Cohen’s speech was protected despite the fact that it might offend
unwilling viewers); id. at 749 n.27 (explaining that the burden is sometimes on the
offended listener to turn away from offensive speech).
221. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
222. Id. at 16.
223. See id. at 21 (noting that those offended in the courthouse “could effectively
avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes”); see
also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210–11 (1975) (citing Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21) (observing that the Constitution generally places the
burden on the unwilling viewer of offensive material “to ‘avoid further bombardment
of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes’”).
224. See Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 765–66 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing
“the minimal discomfort suffered by a listener who inadvertently tunes into a
program he finds offensive during the brief interval before he can simply extend his
arm and switch stations or flick the ‘off’ button”).
225. See id. at 748–49 (explaining that the suggestion of “avoid[ing] further
offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying the
remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow”); see also Njeri Mathis
Rutledge, A Time to Mourn: Balancing the Right of Free Speech Against the Right of Privacy
in Funeral Picketing, 67 MD. L. REV. 295, 330 (2008) (declaring that Cohen is
distinguishable from funeral picketing in the ability to avert one’s attention).
226. See Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 750 (explaining that the context of the speech
is “all important”).
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227

an ordinance that prohibited disruptive
Grayned v. City of Rockford
228
demonstrations during public school hours. Under the ordinance,
individuals were permitted to engage in protests; their speech was not
229
However, they were not permitted to hold such protests
chilled.
during school hours because doing so might disrupt the classes in
230
session.
At least one question raised by Phelps involves the
231
permissible steps that might be taken to prevent funeral picketing,
so as not to disturb the peace and tranquility of the mourners while
also allowing ample alternatives so that the desired messages could
232
still be communicated.
C. Reconciling the Different Cases with Phelps
Prior to Phelps, the existing case law did not clearly dictate a
particular result in a funeral-picketing case where defamation was not
at issue. Where there has been no injury to reputation, defamation
cases are not clearly on point, although the jurisprudence might
nonetheless suggest how such a case should be decided. Although
Falwell also involved an intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim, it, too, is not clearly on point because it was brought by a
public figure and the holding seemed designed to preclude an end
233
run around First Amendment protections.
Precisely because
Snyder was a private individual rather than a public figure and
because damages would be imposed because of the outrageousness of
where the protest took place rather than solely what was said, Falwell
would seem distinguishable.
Some cases have spoken to the great importance of protecting free
expression. For example, the Cohen Court cautioned that one
“cannot lose sight of the fact that, in what otherwise might seem a
trifling and annoying instance of individual distasteful abuse of a
234
privilege, these fundamental societal values are truly implicated.”
227. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
228. See id. at 121 (1972) (holding that the antinoise ordinance was not invalid on
its face).
229. See id. at 119–21 (holding that the antinoise ordinance was not overbroad).
230. Id. at 107–08.
231. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218 (2011) (noting that “Westboro’s
choice of where and when to conduct its picketing [was] not beyond the
Government’s regulatory reach”).
232. See Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 366 (6th Cir. 2008) (recognizing
the state’s ability to protect those who are engaged in “collective, shared grief . . . [in
paying] their final respects to the deceased and to offer comfort to one another”).
233. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988) (holding that speech
does lose its First Amendment protection when it is motivated by an intent to cause
severe emotional distress ).
234. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
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Since it is “often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric” and
because one cannot “forbid particular words without also running a
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process . . . [and
providing] a convenient guise for banning the expression of
236
unpopular views,” the Court must keep a watchful eye on those who
would countenance the imposition of burdens on expression. Yet,
the Pacifica Foundation Court seemed to view Cohen with a jaundiced
237
eye, and funeral picketing might be understood as a variant of
Pacifica Foundation in which speech should be prohibited in one place
at a particular time, justified by a nuisance theory. Basically, the
claim would be that funeral picketing should be precluded regardless
of the content of the speech. Indeed, many of the statutes aimed at
238
prohibiting funeral picketing are written in content-neutral terms
239
that restrict all speech at a particular place during particular times.
1.

Compliance with the law: a vaccine against tortious liability?
The Phelps Court emphasized that the “church members had the
right to be where they were. Westboro alerted local authorities to its
funeral protest and fully complied with police guidance on where the
240
picketing could be staged.” Further, much of what the Church said
241
involved “matters of public import,” notwithstanding that some of
their comments might have been thought to have involved matters of
242
purely private concern.
Regrettably, the Court was too reticent when explaining why it
235. Id.
236. Id. at 26.
237. See supra notes 220–25 and accompanying text (discussing the Pacifica
Foundation Court’s rejection of the avert-your-eyes remedy suggested by Cohen).
238. See, e.g., McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 985 (E.D. Ky. 2006)
(examining a Kentucky funeral picketing statute and declaring it to be content
neutral, “motivated by the need to prevent all interferences with all funerals
regardless of the content or creator of the interference . . . [and] to the extent that
the provisions are justified by the need to prevent citizens from being subjected to all
unwanted communications, regardless of the content or communicator”).
239. See Christina E. Wells, Privacy and Funeral Protests, 87 N.C. L. REV. 151,
173 (2008) (suggesting that funeral picketing statutes will likely be treated as “facially
content-neutral because, by their terms, they do not regulate content”); see also
Stephen R. McAllister, Funeral Picketing Laws and Free Speech, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 575,
580 (2007) (noting that most state picketing restrictions are specific in that they
create buffer zones for a specific time period around a specific location).
240. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218 (2011).
241. Id. at 1217.
242. Id. at 1226 (Alito, J., dissenting) (contending that the attack on the Snyders
“was not speech on a matter of public concern”). But see id. at 1217 (majority
opinion) (asserting that the placards in question highlighted “issues of public
import,” such as “the political and moral conduct of the United States and its
citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving
the Catholic clergy”).
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mattered that the Phelps family followed police directions. It is
almost as if the Court was estopping the state from punishing
members of the Phelps family because they complied with the
243
Yet, at issue was not the violation of a
instructions of the police.
criminal statute but, instead, the potential liability of the defendants
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. By telling the
Phelps family where they should stage their demonstration, the police
were not implicitly promising immunity from a civil suit. If the
defendants had made defamatory statements from that location, they
244
would not have been immunized by following police directions.
The defendants also would not have been immunized if the protest
had been so loud that those participating in the funeral could not
245
help but hear the protests.
The Phelps Court understood that “Westboro’s choice to convey its
views in conjunction with Matthew Snyder’s funeral made the
expression of those views particularly hurtful to many, especially
246
Matthew’s father.” Indeed, the Court had recently recognized that
family members “have a personal stake in honoring and mourning
their dead and objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by
intruding upon their own grief, tends to degrade the rites and
respect they seek to accord to the deceased person who was once
247
their own.”
Yet, the Court seemed to belie its appreciation of the
harm done to Matthew Snyder’s father with respect to the comments
that might have been interpreted as being directed specifically at the
Snyder family.

243. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 570–71 (1965) (explaining that it was
improper to convict a demonstration leader for violating a statute punishing
picketing near a courthouse when police had granted the demonstrators permission
to meet across the street from a courthouse and the demonstration was confined to
that area); cf. Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609, 618–19 (Mass. 1993)
(affording the defendants an affirmative defense against a manslaughter charge
because the Attorney General had issued a potentially misleading opinion regarding
the legal obligations of Christian Science parents with respect to the refusal of
medical treatment for their children).
244. See Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1214 (noting that the necessary elements of
defamation could not be established). Had those elements been established, the
defamatory comments would not have been protected merely because they had not
been made too close to the funeral.
245. See id. at 1220 (noting that the speech “did not itself disrupt the funeral”); cf.
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (declaring that it is a “permissible exercise
of legislative discretion to bar sound trucks with broadcasts of public interests,
amplified to a loud and raucous volume, from the public ways of municipalities”); see
also Zachary P. Augustine, Comment, Speech Shouldn’t Be “Free” at Funerals: An Analysis
of the Respect for America’s Fallen Heroes Act, 28 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 375, 397 (2008)
(denoting the use of sound amplification devices at funeral protests).
246. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1217.
247. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 168 (2004).
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While many of the comments on the defendants’ signs involved
248
matters of public concern, some did not. The Court seemed to
recognize this when noting that “even if a few of the signs—such as
‘You’re Going to Hell’ and ‘God Hates You’—were viewed as
containing messages related to Matthew Snyder or the Snyders
specifically, that would not change the fact that the overall thrust and
dominant theme of Westboro’s demonstration spoke to broader
249
public issues.” However, as Justice Alito points out in his dissent, it
was utterly unclear why comments discussing matters of purely private
250
concern were not considered actionable.
One can contrast the Phelps Court’s discussion of the signs “You’re
Going to Hell” and “God Hates You” with the analysis offered by the
Fourth Circuit of those same signs. The Fourth Circuit concluded
that “these two signs cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating
251
actual facts about any individual.”
Certainly, courts will sometimes construe statements in a particular
way as a matter of law, jury construction to the contrary
notwithstanding. For example, consider the comments made about a
252
particular individual, Charles Bresler, at a public meeting. Bresler
253
sought a zoning variance from the local city council.
He also
254
owned land that the city wished to purchase for a new high school.
Bresler was apparently driving a hard bargain and was accused during
255
the meeting of engaging in blackmail.
That accusation was later
256
published in a local newspaper. The question before the Court was
whether the charge against Bresler could reasonably be construed as
257
a claim that he committed a felony. The Court held that the charge
258
could not reasonably have been so construed, notwithstanding that
248. See Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1216–17 (listing some of the signs including: “God
Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,” “America is Doomed,” “Don’t Pray for the
USA,” “Thank God for IEDs,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Pope in Hell”).
249. Id. at 1217.
250. Id. at 1227 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“I fail to see why actionable speech should
be immunized simply because it is interspersed with speech that is protected. The
First Amendment allows recovery for defamatory statements that are interspersed
with nondefamatory statements on matters of public concern, and there is no good
reason why respondents’ attack on Matthew Snyder and his family should be treated
differently.”).
251. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 224 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207
(2011).
252. Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g. Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 7 (1970).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 13.
258. Id. at 14 (expressing disbelief that a reader would not have understood the
term “blackmail” in the contested articles to mean that “it was Bresler’s public and
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the term “blackmail” can refer to a criminal act depending upon the
context.
Yet, the Bresler Court was on firmer ground when it construed the
blackmail charge as not involving a claim about the commission of a
felony than was the Fourth Circuit in Phelps when it denied that any
matters of purely private concern had been addressed. As Justice
Alito suggested in his dissent, some of the signs at the funeral and
some of the comments on the website seemed to be directed at the
Snyders in particular and might quite reasonably have been
259
construed as not involving any matters of public concern.
Those
comments might instead have been interpreted to be brutal attacks
260
upon Matthew Snyder that were “almost certain to inflict injury.”
Indeed, the Fourth Circuit at one point admitted in passing that “[a]
reasonable reader could interpret these signs . . . as referring to
261
Snyder or his son only . . . .”
The United States Supreme Court should be commended for
admitting that some of the material might have been construed not
262
to involve a matter of public concern, but the Court should have
263
taken up Justice Alito’s challenge and addressed the possible tort
ramifications of the Phelps family saying to the deceased’s family that
the deceased was going to hell. The Court could have argued that
the jury was and would be presented with an impossible task. Not
only would they have been asked to determine whether the
defendants’ actions, rather than Matthew Snyder’s death, had caused
wholly legal negotiating proposals that were being criticized”); see also Old Dominion
Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 285
(1974) (noting that it was “impossible to believe” that a reader of the newsletter in
question was accusing “the appellees with committing the criminal offense of
treason”).
259. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1225—26 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting); see
also Jason M. Dorsky, Note, A New Battleground for Free Speech: The Impact of Snyder v.
Phelps, 7 PIERCE L. REV. 235, 240—41 (2009) (suggesting that it was a “particularly
egregious miscalculation” for the Church “to include signs and chants aimed directly
at the family of Matthew Snyder”).
260. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1223–24 (Alito, J., dissenting); cf. Jeffrey Shulman, Free
Speech at What Cost?: Snyder v. Phelps and Speech-Based Tort Liability, 2010 CARDOZO L.
REV. DE NOVO 313, 336 (2010) (claiming that the state has no interest in protecting
statements designed for wounding private individuals).
261. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 224 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207
(2011).
262. See Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1217 (2011). It is not always easy to tell whether
something is a matter of public concern; cf. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 553
(1989) (White, J., dissenting) (“There is no public interest in publishing the names,
addresses, and phone numbers of persons who are the victims of crime . . . .”).
263. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1228 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“I would therefore hold that,
in this setting, the First Amendment permits a private figure to recover for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by speech on a matter of private
concern.”).
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Albert Snyder’s severe harm, but they would also have been asked to
determine which statements—protected versus unprotected—had
caused that harm. That kind of delimitation might have been
thought an impossible task.
Suppose the jury could somehow decide how much of the harm
was caused by unprotected expression that targeted the family rather
than protected expression that focused on matters of public concern.
The facts of Phelps raise another difficulty: some of the expressions
264
on the signs were also included in the epic on the Church’s website.
Even if it was permissible to make certain kinds of speech at the
funeral site subject to tort liability, such a cause of action could fail to
reach the expressions included on the website. If, indeed, the Court
were to hold that the statements made on the website were
265
protected, then the jury’s job would be that much harder because
particular contents on the website would be protected even though
those very same statements would not be protected if they were made
on the day of the funeral. The jury would then have the very difficult,
if not impossible, task of determining which of the distasteful,
personally-directed statements caused the father’s continuing
anguish—the protected, distasteful comments on the website or the
unprotected statements at the funeral.
There is precedent for the Court’s striking down a damages award
because of the insuperably difficult question of damages presented.
266
For example, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.
the Court
considered “the effect of [its decision] that much of petitioners’
conduct was constitutionally protected on the ability of the State to
impose liability for elements of the boycott that were not so
267
protected.”
The Claiborne Hardware Court explained that “the
presence of activity protected by the First Amendment imposes
restraints on the grounds that may give rise to damages liability and
268
on the persons who may be held accountable for those damages.”
The Court cautioned that only those damages caused by conduct
269
outside First Amendment protection could be awarded,
and
264. The Phelps Court did not discuss the additional difficulties created by the
website because Snyder did not address it in his petition for certiorari. See id. at 1214
n.1 (“The epic is not properly before us and does not factor in our analysis.”).
265. But see id. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“It does not follow, however, that
they may intentionally inflict severe emotional injury on private persons at a time of
intense emotional sensitivity by launching vicious verbal attacks that make no
contribution to public debate.”).
266. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
267. Id. at 916.
268. Id. at 916–17.
269. See id. at 918 (“Only those losses proximately caused by unlawful conduct may
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explained that any consideration of liability “on the basis of a public
address—which predominantly contained highly charged political
rhetoric lying at the core of the First Amendment— . . . [should be
270
approached with] extreme care.” Basically, because it could not be
shown that an unprotected part of Charles Evers’ “[s]trong and
271
effective extemporaneous rhetoric” proximately caused the illegal
272
acts at issue, the Court rejected the imposition of liability against
273
him.
Perhaps the Phelps Court was similarly concerned about
limiting the ways that public rhetoric was used.
The Phelps Court did address some of the ramifications of its
opinion. For example, the Court explained that the decision did not
address “speech on public matters [that] was in any way contrived to
274
insulate speech on a private matter from liability.”
Consider what
the Court might have had in mind. Suppose that an individual was
speaking to a group that happened to include a divorced parent of a
child who had recently committed suicide. Knowing of the parent’s
vulnerable state, the individual started talking about how society
should make divorce more difficult to obtain, because of the untold
harms that no–fault divorce imposes on children, sometimes even
causing them to commit suicide. Further assume that the reason this
discussion was put forward was not to discuss a matter of public
concern, but to inflict great harm on the mourning parent by causing
the parent to blame herself for her child’s suicide. The Phelps Court
implies that an intentional infliction of emotional distress award
based on such a scenario might pass constitutional muster, assuming
all the elements of the tort were met in light of local law.
2. A balance of interests: Snyder’s right to privacy and the Church’s right to
protest
Ample evidence suggests that the Phelps family was not targeting
275
the Snyders in particular as opposed to other families of soldiers
who had died in war or other individuals whose funerals could be
276
picketed to gain public exposure.
The Court was clear about why
be recovered.”).
270. Id. at 926–27.
271. Id. at 928.
272. See id.
273. See id. at 929 (noting the constitutional inadequacy of the findings supporting
a damage award).
274. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217 (2011).
275. See, e.g., id. (highlighting the lack of a pre-existing conflict between the
church and Snyder that could suggest that Westboro was merely intending to mask a
private attack against Snyder).
276. See id. at 1224 (Alito, J., dissenting) (elaborating upon the Church’s strategy

STRASSER.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

316

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/26/2012 8:08 PM

[Vol. 61:279

the funerals were being picketed—as a method by which Phelps and
277
the Church would get increased publicity.
Snyder argued that it
was important to consider the context in which the picketing
278
The Court rejected that the context
occurred—his son’s funeral.
changed the character of the speech from a matter of public concern
279
to one of private concern.
A different way to understand the point about context is to
consider the Pacifica Foundation analogy to nuisance law—even
speech protected by the First Amendment may be restricted in where
280
or when it is delivered.
Traditional time, place, and manner
restrictions impose some limitations on where speech can be
delivered. Such restrictions are valid, provided that “they are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they
are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and
that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication
281
of the information.”
Indeed, the Court was careful to note that it
was not discussing the constitutionality of the various state statutes
282
imposing content-neutral restrictions on funeral picketing.
Consider a state law that prohibits demonstrations near funerals.
The Phelps family might challenge the constitutionality of such a law,
arguing that the Church would not have adequate alternative
channels of communication, since the Church would not get the
same media attention if prevented from spreading its message at
283
funerals.
However, as the Court has pointed out elsewhere, “the
of protesting military funerals, the funerals of public safety officers, and the victims
of “natural disasters, accidents, and shocking crimes”).
277. Id. at 1217 (“There is no doubt that Westboro chose to stage its picketing at
the Naval Academy, the Maryland State House, and Matthew Snyder’s funeral to
increase publicity for its views.”); see also Dorsky, supra note 259, at 243 (positing that
the Church did not select its venues because of religious purposes, “but rather by the
desire to be noticed”). The Eighth Circuit characterized the purpose of the
Church’s picketing somewhat differently. See Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 509 F.3d 480,
483 (8th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging the appellant’s claim that “funerals are the only
place where her religious message can be delivered in a timely and relevant
manner”).
278. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1217.
279. Id. (noting that the context of Lance Corporal Snyder’s funeral did not “by
itself transform the nature of Westboro’s speech”).
280. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731–32, 750 (1978).
281. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (citing
City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)).
282. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1218 (“Maryland now has a law imposing restrictions on
funeral picketing . . . . To the extent [this law is] content neutral, [it] raise[s] very
different questions from the tort verdict at issue in this case . . . . [W]e have no
occasion to consider whether it or other similar regulations are constitutional.”); see
also Rutledge, supra note 225, at 318 (arguing that the picketing statutes would
“probably be considered content neutral”).
283. See Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 509 F.3d 480, 488 (8th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging
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First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s
284
views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired.”
For example, in Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
285
Inc., the Court upheld a restriction that prevented Krishnas from
286
walking around a state fair asking for donations, notwithstanding
testimony that the group’s mission would be severely impaired were it
287
so constricted and that the implicated speech was unquestionably
288
protected by the First Amendment. But if preventing the Krishnas
from utilizing the most effective form of communication did not
violate constitutional guarantees, then preventing the Phelps family
from utilizing the most effective method might also pass
289
constitutional muster. It seems likely that a content-neutral funeralpicketing law would be upheld as a valid time, place, manner
290
restriction.
Phelps’s captive audience problem
291
Snyder, who was awarded damages for intrusion upon seclusion,
argued that he was “a member of a captive audience at his son’s
292
funeral.”
However, the Court rejected the use of the captive
3.

that Phelps-Roper had a “fair chance” of proving, for preliminary injunction
purposes, that there were insufficient alternative channels of communication to
funeral picketing, as the picketers “wish to reach an audience which can only be
addressed at such occasion and to convey to and through such an audience a
particular message”). But see Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 372 (6th Cir.
2008) (rejecting Phelps-Roper’s contention that there were no alternative channels
of communication, as she could picket at other times and had other means of
communicating her message via the church’s website).
284. Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
647 (1981) (citing Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47–48 (1966)).
285. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
286. See id. at 654 (accepting “the State’s interest in confining distribution, selling,
and fund solicitation activities to fixed locations” as a significant governmental
interest that can be pursued through a reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction); id. at 655 (noting that the Krishnas could arrange for their own booth
and sell their literature from within rather than on the fairgrounds itself).
287. Id. at 653 (“ISKCON desires to proselytize at the fair because it believes it can
successfully communicate and raise funds. In its view, this can be done only by
intercepting fair patrons as they move about, and if success is achieved, stopping
them momentarily or for longer periods as money is given or exchanged for
literature.”).
288. Id. at 647 (acknowledging the state’s concession that the Krishnas’ activities
fell within the protection of the First Amendment).
289. See Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 372 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing
Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647) (noting that Phelps-Roper was “not entitled to her best
means of communication”). ,
290. See Edwards v. City of Santa Barbara, 150 F.3d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998) (per
curiam) (upholding an ordinance that “prohibit[ed] all demonstration activity
within a specified distance of health care facilities and places of worship without
regard to the message conveyed”).
291. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
292. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219–20 (2011).
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293

audience doctrine, because “Snyder could see no more than the
tops of the signs when driving to the funeral . . . [and] there [was] no
indication that the picketing in any way interfered with the funeral
294
service itself.”
The Court explained that the captive audience
doctrine is applied “only sparingly to protect unwilling listeners from
295
protected speech,” such as when it is forced upon a listener in his
296
own home. In Rowan v. United States Post Office Department, the
Court noted that individuals in their own homes are free to refuse to
297
receive unwanted information, but explained that merely because
individuals are sometimes a captive audience within the home does
not mean individuals necessarily share in that protection outside the
298
home. For example, individuals do not have a constitutional right
299
to be free from an unwanted radio broadcast on a public streetcar,
although Justice Douglas suggested in his dissent in Public Utilities
Commission v. Pollak that individuals who take streetcars are a “captive
audience” and should not be forced to be subjected to unwanted
300
messages.
He offered a similar analysis in a concurrence over
twenty years later when discussing some of the protections that
301
should be accorded to commuters using public transportation.
It is unclear whether the Court would have been willing to apply
the captive audience doctrine had the funeral been interrupted or,
302
perhaps, had the signs been noticeably and disruptively visible.
Ironically, when upholding the Ohio funeral-picketing law, the Sixth
293. Id. at 1220 (declining to apply the captive audience doctrine because the
doctrine is used “only sparingly”).
294. Id.; see also Wells, supra note 239, at 155 (“Peaceful protests do not invade
funerals in the sense that this term is traditionally understood. They are neither
noisy nor disruptive. They do not necessarily impede funeral services. Nor do they
involve harassment causing attendees to avoid the service. In other words, peaceful
protests do not invade funeral-goers’ seclusion.”).
295. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1220.
296. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
297. Id. at 738 (rejecting the proposition that “a vendor has a right under the
Constitution . . . to send unwanted material into the home of another”).
298. Id. at 738.
299. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 454 (1952).
300. Id. at 468 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
301. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (4–1–4
decision) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“In my view the right of the commuters to be
free from forced intrusions on their privacy precludes the city from transforming its
vehicles of public transportation into forums for the dissemination of ideas upon this
captive audience.”).
302. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (explaining that “Snyder
could see no more than the tops of the signs when driving to the funeral [and that]
there [was] no indication that the picketing in any way interfered with the funeral
service itself”); cf. Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227, 1233 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc)
(dismissing the defendants’ claim that they had “a right to enter the cathedral and
disrupt the church services of the plaintiffs” as this was “an intolerable violation of
the rights of those engaged in worship”).
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Circuit included within its justification the fact that the picketers had
not been prevented from communicating with the mourners by
303
making use of very large signs.
Suppose, then, that Snyder saw the content of some very large signs
along the way to the funeral. In such a scenario, the funeral still
would not have been disrupted; it is unlikely that there would have
been a delay or that the service would have been in competition with
loud protesters. However, the funeral might very well have been
disrupted for Albert Snyder, who might have become so disturbed by
the signs that his grieving process would have been completely
undermined.
In the envisioned scenario, Snyder might have been disturbed that
there were signs at his son’s funeral at all and by the contents of the
signs in particular. The Phelps Court implicitly rejected that Snyder
found the very fact of a demonstration disturbing—the Court
hypothesized that “[a] group of parishioners standing at the very spot
where Westboro stood, holding signs that said ‘God Bless America’
304
and ‘God Loves You,’ would not have been subjected to liability,”
implying that liability would only have been imposed because of
disagreement with the message. Yet, suppose instead that there were
signs advocating the consumption of a particular cereal for breakfast
or supporting a particular candidate. Such signs might be disturbing,
even if Snyder liked that cereal or supported that candidate, precisely
because those holding the signs were attempting to take advantage of
305
the funeral to get free publicity.
Certainly, one might point out that advertising a commercial
product or promoting someone’s candidacy at a funeral might be
unwise, because one might thereby promote consumer or elector ill
306
will rather than good will.
But the same point might have been
303. Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 370 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he
Funeral Protest Provision does not place ‘limitations on the number, size, text, or
images’ of placards, and places ‘no limitation on the number of speakers or the noise
level, including the use of amplification equipment.’ Thus, it is conceivable that
picketers outside of the 300-foot buffer zone can still communicate their message to
funeral attendees.”).
304. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1219.
305. Zipursky suggests that liability might have been imposed had a publicity
seeking group held signs saying: “Love and Hot Sex, Not War!”. See Zipursky, supra
note 127, at 518. But these signs might also be viewed as political, and one might
infer from Phelps that the First Amendment would have precluded liability in that
case too. The point here is that even those agreeing with a message, whether
political or commercial, might nonetheless believe the messages to be inappropriate
at a funeral.
306. Cf. Julie Anderson & David Fish, Note, Sotelo v. Directrevenue, LLC: Paving
the Way for a Spyware-Free Internet, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 841,
841 (2006) (discussing a “form of advertising [that] has gained popularity with
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made about the wisdom of the Westboro Church funeral-picketing
policies and that has not dissuaded them from engaging in that
behavior.
It is worth considering how a Phelps-like case would be decided if
protesters picketed a funeral in violation of local law. One of the
ironic aspects of the Phelps opinion is that it leaves open whether
there would be tort liability in the hypothesized case and even
whether a content-neutral law would be more likely to pass muster if
it restricted speech at funerals in particular or, instead, was more
generally applicable.
While some courts and commentators have suggested that funerals
should be treated differently for purposes of the captive audience
307
doctrine, the Phelps Court did not focus on aspects that were unique
to funerals. For example, the Court noted that the protest was
308
orderly and staged where the police had instructed and that no
evidence was presented to establish that the protest had interrupted
309
the service.
But if these are the relevant factors, then protesters
who interfere with a religious service in violation of law might also be
310
punished, even if that service does not involve a funeral.
The Pacifica Foundation nuisance rationale was offered in the
advertisers, but [that] has generated much ill-will with consumers”).
307. See Strickland, 539 F.3d at 364–65 (comparing the right of privacy in
mourning to the right of privacy of “individuals in their homes or individuals
entering a medical facility”)); McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 992 (E.D.
Ky. 2006) (“[Funeral] attendees have an interest in avoiding unwanted, obtrusive
communications which is at least similar to a person’s interest in avoiding such
communications inside his home. Further, like medical patients entering a medical
facility, funeral attendees are captive.”); see also Brownstein & Amar, supra note 35, at
373 (“While the issue is certainly not free from doubt and argument, we believe, as
we elaborate below, that funerals present a similarly or more compelling case of
audience captivity and vulnerability as the circumstances discussed in [other cases
where the captive audience doctrine was applied].”); Jeffrey Shulman, The Outrageous
God: Emotional Distress, Tort Liability, and the Limits of Religious Advocacy, 113 PENN ST.
L. REV. 381, 406 (2008) (arguing that “funeral attendees are captive in a way that
deserves the same recognition afforded the resident in his or her home, or the
patient in a medical facility”). But see Wells, supra note 239, at 231 (cautioning that
extending the captive audience doctrine as described in Frisby on the grounds that
funerals are “particularly unique and deserving of broader privacy protection” would
be a “mistake”).
308. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213.
309. Id. at 1220.
310. See, e.g., St. David’s Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, 921 P.2d
821, 830, 834 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (affirming an injunctive order on the grounds
that “the government has a legitimate interest in protecting the privacy of one’s
place of worship”); cf. Edwards v. City of Santa Barbara, 150 F.3d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir.
1998) (per curiam) (upholding an ordinance that “prohibits all demonstration
activity within a specified distance of health care facilities and places of worship
without regard to the message conveyed”); Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227, 1232–
33 (8th Cir. 1971) (noting that the defendants do not have a right to “disrupt the
church services of the plaintiffs”).
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context of an individual receiving an unwelcome radio transmission
311
while driving in his car rather than at his house, so the captive
audience doctrine might not require that funerals in particular be
targeted. Further, the Phelps Court did not seem receptive to carving
out a special exception for funerals. For example, when Snyder
312
claimed that the funeral setting presented unique circumstances,
the Court noted that “Westboro chose to stage its picketing at the
Naval Academy, the Maryland State House, and Matthew Snyder’s
313
funeral to increase publicity for its views,” as if the staged protests at
each of these locations should be analyzed in the same way and the
314
fact that one of these involved a funeral did not alter the analysis.
That the Court seems to be treating funerals no differently from
other kinds of events might decrease the likelihood that the Court
would recognize a captive audience exception for funerals. Certainly,
the Phelps Court made clear that it was not addressing the
constitutionality of a content-neutral picketing law and suggested that
315
such a law might pass muster. Nonetheless, the Court went out of its
way to note that there have been “a few limited situations where the
location of targeted picketing can be regulated under provisions that
316
the Court has determined to be content neutral.” Such a comment
suggests that a content-neutral statute limiting funeral picketing
might not pass muster after all because there have been only a few
limited situations in which content-neutral statutes limiting targeting
317
picketing have been upheld.
Phelps’s impact on the regulation of funeral picketing
The Phelps Court seems to intentionally provide no direction to
lower courts. While the Court made clear that the damage award at
issue could not stand, one cannot tell from the opinion whether
content-neutral funeral protest restrictions pass muster as a
reasonable time, place, manner restriction or, perhaps, on a captive
audience rationale. Further, legislators wishing to draft or amend
4.

311. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 730 (1978).
312. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1217 (“Snyder goes on to argue that Westboro’s speech
should be afforded less than full First Amendment protection ‘not only because of
the words’ but also because the church members exploited the funeral . . . .”).
313. Id.
314. Cf. Wells, supra note 239, at 231 (arguing that funerals should not be singled
out for special treatment).
315. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1218 (“[Content neutral picketing laws] raise very
different questions from the tort verdict at issue in this case.”).
316. Id. (emphasis added).
317. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding an ordinance that
banned targeting picketing of a home).
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legislation in this area might well feel frustrated. One cannot tell
whether such legislation would be more likely to pass muster by
protecting funerals in particular, because such statutes would be
318
more narrowly tailored, or whether legislation that protected
religious services from interruption as a general matter would be
more likely to pass muster because it would be less plausible to
319
believe that the legislation was targeting unpopular speech.
Suppose that a state statute specifically restricting funeral protests
320
is held to pass constitutional muster.
A separate question is
whether the Court would permit the imposition of damages for
intentional infliction of emotional distress under such
321
circumstances.
Certainly, the picketing at issue would not be protected by the First
Amendment in that ex hypothesi the protesters would have violated a
constitutionally-valid law. But that would not settle the question at
hand. Presumably, when upholding the validity of the contentneutral statute, the Court would say that “an incidental burden on
speech is no greater than is essential . . . so long as the neutral
regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be
322
achieved less effectively absent the regulation.” However, the Court
would presumably fear that any intentional infliction of damages
would turn “on the content and viewpoint of the message conveyed,
323
rather than any interference with the funeral itself.”
While the
Court has not always rejected imposing a penalty on speech that was
324
at least in part motivated by the content of the speech, the Court
has struck down a law penalizing speech on the basis of content, even
though that speech could have been punished under a content325
neutral statute. As the R.A.V. Court noted, “the power to proscribe
318. Cf. Phelps-Roper v. Taft, 523 F. Supp. 2d 612, 619 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (“As to
the fixed buffer zone, the Court finds that the statute is not substantially broader
than necessary to achieve the State of Ohio’s legitimate interest in protecting its
citizens from unwanted communications while they attend a funeral or burial
service.”)
319. See Lauren M. Miller, Comment, A Funeral for Free Speech? Examining the
Constitutionality of Funeral Picketing Acts, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1097, 1127 (2007) (claiming
that the “purpose and function” of the funeral picketing statutes is “to silence the
unpopular viewpoints of a small sect of religious outsiders”).
320. See Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 358 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding
Ohio Funeral Procession Provision).
321. See Brownstein & Amar, supra note 35, at 386–87 (advocating that such
damages be potentially awarded when the defendant had violated a constitutionally
permissible law prohibiting funeral picketing).
322. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985).
323. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011).
324. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744 (1978) (acknowledging that the
Commission’s objections were based, in part, on the content of the broadcast).
325. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down an ordinance
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particular speech on the basis of a noncontent element, like noise,
does not entail the power to proscribe the same speech on the basis
326
of a content element.”
Thus, merely because funeral protesting
might be subject to sanction because violating a content-neutral
time, place, or manner statute does not establish that the Court
would uphold tort damages for intentional infliction of emotional
distress based on the outrageous content of the comments made at
the funeral, assuming that the comments involved matters of public
concern. This means that even those violating the statute might not
be subject to tort liability for the content of their speech.
At least two issues would be implicated in such a case. First, merely
because a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction had
been violated would not mean that local law also permitted a tort
action to be brought based on that violation. Second, even if local
327
law did permit such an action, it is not clear after Phelps whether
any tort award based on that violation would be upheld.
The Phelps Court emphasized that it “was what Westboro said that
328
exposed it to tort damages,” and that “any distress occasioned by
Westboro’s picketing turned on the content and viewpoint of the
message conveyed, rather than any interference with the funeral
329
itself.”
But even if interference with the funeral was added to the
facts of Phelps, a potential difficulty would still exist—that damages
would have been imposed because the jury disagreed with the speech,
not because the jury believed it was outrageous to stage a protest at a
funeral. So, too, local law affording a tort remedy under these
circumstances might not allay the Court’s worry that an award could
be based on the jury’s disagreement with the message rather than on
its belief that funerals should not be disturbed.

punishing cross burning because it targeted speech, even though those burning a
cross in someone’s yard could have been prosecuted under other ordinances, for
example against outdoor fires in city limits. See id. at 385.
326. Id. at 386 (1992).
327. See, e.g., Chelsea Brown, Student Work, Not Your Mother’s Remedy: A Civil
Action Response to the Westboro Baptist Church’s Military Funeral Demonstrations, 112 W.
VA. L. REV. 207, 234 (2009) (“Mississippi enacted legislation, in addition to its
criminal penalties, allowing any surviving member of the deceased’s family who is
damaged or threatened with loss or injury by reason of a violation to sue for
damages, so long as there is credible evidence that a person violated or is likely to
violate the state’s prohibition against disruptive protest at a funeral service within
one hour before, during, or after the service.”).
328. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. at 1219.
329. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Phelps raises more questions than it answers. The Court explained
that tort damages for nondefamatory speech on matters of public
concern could not be awarded without offending constitutional
guarantees. But the Court did not make clear which, if any, factors
were dispositive, so it is difficult to determine whether—or to what
extent—the case has import for either tort or First Amendment law.
One understanding of the opinion is that the case is not
particularly noteworthy. At issue was quiet and orderly speech on a
matter of public concern. The protest, which did not interrupt the
funeral, complied with the directions of the police.
When
characterized this way, the case seems to involve political speech that
took place in accord with local law and so should not, of course, be
subject to tort damages. Many political statements are taken to heart
330
and may cause real emotional harm, and the Court does not want
to permit tort law to chill speech on important matters.
Yet, there are other ways to understand the decision that may make
it a watershed opinion. While the Phelps Court suggested that its
331
holding was “narrow,” the Court did not do a particularly good job
in limiting the applicability of the decision. The Court noted, for
example, that Snyder did not see the content of the signs on the way
332
to the funeral.
But suppose that he had, and the content of the
signs was so distracting that Snyder’s mind was reeling both during
and after the funeral. Would that be enough to change the holding
even though the speech would have occurred in a public place on
matters of public concern? After all, as the Court pointed out,
333
speech can “inflict great pain.”
By the same token, it is uncertain
whether the Court would uphold content-neutral funeral protest
limitations and, even if it did, whether the Court would uphold tort
liability for the violation of such a statute by protesters discussing
matters of public concern.
An additional question is whether Phelps has implications for the
intersection of tort and First Amendment law more generally. The
Phelps Court implied that liability could not be imposed because the

330. See id. at 1220 (“Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them
to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain.”)
331. Id.
332. Id. at 1213–14.
333. Id. at 1220.
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334

But if speech
speech at issue involved matters of public concern.
on matters of public concern can be immunized in the funeral
protest context, then one must wonder whether matters of public
concern will now be trumpeted in other contexts as well. For
example, this could be a signal that the Court wishes to resurrect
335
Rosenbloom, its overruling of the case in Gertz notwithstanding, and
require actual malice in all defamation cases involving matters of
public concern, whether or not the plaintiff is a public figure.
The Court’s suggestion that some matters not of public concern
were not actionable because “the overall thrust and dominant
336
theme . . . spoke to broader public issues” cannot help but confuse
the current jurisprudence. One cannot tell, for example, whether
the Court is signaling that speech on a matter of public concern, if
predominating, will immunize actionable speech on matters of purely
private concern, as long as the former speech is not offered to
337
insulate the latter.
This would be a significant change in the
current jurisprudence.
As Justice Alito suggests, the “First
Amendment allows recovery for defamatory statements that are
interspersed with nondefamatory statements on matters of public
338
concern.”
If, indeed, the Phelps family’s comments on matters of
purely private concern would have been actionable but for their
comments on matters of public concern, it is not clear
jurisprudentially why their comments on matters of public concern
should have had an immunizing effect.
One must also wonder whether Phelps has implications for the
constitutional limitations on awards in non-defamation cases. In the
past, the Court has refused to preclude liability merely because the
339
speech at issue involved a matter of public concern.
One cannot
tell, however, whether the Phelps holding has implications for a case
like Zacchini—perhaps even a case involving unjust enrichment would
be barred if it involves a publication on a matter of public concern.
Or, perhaps, Phelps is not intended to apply to tort damages where
340
defamation is not at issue. Indeed, it is not clear whether an unjust
334. Id. at 1215.
335. See supra Part II.A.2–3.
336. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217.
337. Cf. id. (“We are not concerned in this case that Westboro’s speech on public
matters was in any way contrived to insulate speech on a private matter from
liability.”).
338. See id. at 1227 (Alito, J., dissenting).
339. See supra notes 171–76 and accompanying text.
340. Defamation was at issue in Phelps at the trial level, where the trial court held
that there was no defamation as a matter of law. See supra note 27 and accompanying
text.
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enrichment action against funeral protesters would pass
constitutional muster, assuming that the elements of the tort were
met under local law.
Some may celebrate the open-ended nature of Phelps, because it
can be read as either being quite consistent with the pre-existing
jurisprudence or as effecting a sea-change in the jurisprudence. But
lower courts seeking guidance from the Court cannot help but feel
frustrated. Not only has the Court failed to tell them which factors
are important in funeral protest cases in particular, but the Court has
virtually extended an invitation to lower courts to modify the existing
jurisprudence. Consequently, a relatively clear area of the law is
likely to become more, rather than less, confused. While the result in
Phelps may have been correct, the opinion itself has the potential to
be a source of much regret.

